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Abstract
The United Nations (UN) has no internationally-agreed definition of terrorism. The 
definitional impasse has prevented the adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism. Even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the UN failed to adopt 
the Convention, and the deadlock continues to this day. The prime reason is the standoff 
with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The Arab Terrorism Convention 
and the Terrorism Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference defines 
terrorism to exclude armed struggle for liberation and self-determination. This increased 
its complexity and vagueness. The aim of this paper is to examine the definitional aspect 
of terrorism and the challenges faced in adopting a single universally accepted definition 
by the international community. The methodology adopted in this paper is purely a library 
based research focusing mainly on primary and secondary sources. The paper concludes 
that nations or states have to come to agreement on a definition of the term “terrorism”, for 
without a consensus of what constitute terrorism, nations or states could not unite against 
it. A general definition of terrorism is necessary in order for the international community to 
fight against terrorism in a precise way.    
     
Keywords: International law, international terrorism, terrorism, liberation, self-
determination.
Introduction
The term “terrorism” comes from Latin terrere “to cause to tremble”. The term became 
popularized during the “Reign of Terror” and carried out by the revolutionary government 
in France from 1793 to 1794 (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p. 5). In a modern context, it is used 
widely to refer, mainly to either terrorism or international terrorism (Foerster, Heinz, 
Patricia, & Lawrence, 1960; Schmid, 2011 & 2012). We have to bear in mind that with 
increasing number of violence and attacks in many countries, the effects of terrorism are 
far profound i.e. targeting not only the country where terrorist acts take place but also other 
neighbouring and even distant countries. This is similar to cancer as a disease. Cancer does 
not only affect a particular part of the patient’s body, but it spreads to other intact areas as 
well. 
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Due to the effects of terrorism at all levels in the form of crimes that threaten people’s 
lives, civil freedom, institutions and the community, nationally and internationally, several 
definitions, including oppressions of people, violence and cruelty, have been presented to 
refer to terrorism (Carlton & Schaerf, 1975). It should be noted from the outset that although 
terrorism is considered as a crime and despite many conferences were held, focusing mainly 
on conventions and national legislations, the 70 years of attempts to reach an international 
comprehensive agreement to define terrorism were fruitless (Ben, 2006; Hassan, 2011). 
However, recently, due to the advancement of its means and ways historically, terrorism has 
got a new identity. Among all previous movements, Al-Qaeda looked a distinguished one 
due to their extremism when targeting their objectives and operations, which are far-flung, 
co-ordinated and ruthless. According to Adam (2005), international terrorism is believed to 
be more threatening and deadly than any other conventional fights, conflicts or wars. This 
was obviously evidenced in the huge damages and the violation of 5,000 people’s rights 
and lives caused by Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks. Consequently, several bouts of international 
campaigns were initiated following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (September 11) in both New 
York and Washington in 2001. These developments have triggered scholarly interest in 
terrorism particularly on the subject of international terrorism.     
No comprehensive definition of the term “terrorism’’ has been given or agreed upon by the 
States regardless of the continuous historical controversy over it as a debated issue implying 
offence and aggression, particularly the period preceding and following the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 (September 11). The failure by the international community is not only in providing 
a definition, but also in addressing methodologically and scientifically the seriousness and 
effect of terrorism (Hoffman, 1998). Due to the lack of an International Convention at the UN 
providing an established and comprehensive definition of terrorism, it has become difficult 
or if not near impossible to fight terrorism both domestically and internationally. Different 
countries at the international level have different views on the meaning of terrorism. But 
it must be pointed out that despite the historic controversy over the definition of terrorism, 
international consensus has gradually emerged condemning terrorist acts as a violation of 
the “laws of nations” (Hickman, 2011).     
This paper aims to examine the definitional aspect of the term “terrorism” and the 
challenges faced in adopting a single universally accepted definition by the international 
community. The paper is divided into five sections. The first section presents attempts by 
the international community to define terrorism generically since 1920s. These attempts 
have all been unsuccessful since the international community could not agree on the 
exact meaning of terrorism. The second section focuses on the challenges faced by the 
international community in adopting a single universally accepted definition of terrorism. 
The third section deals with international legal instruments adopted by the international 
community to prevent terror acts. The fourth section addresses the emerging consensus 
on certain elements of definition of terrorism by the international community. The fifth 
section shall focus on the conclusion, which will embrace some recommendations in order 
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to overcome the problems we face in the fight against terrorism as a result of the absence 
of a universally accepted definition. In this paper, the authors argue that although there 
is no universally accepted definition of terrorism in international law, it is still arguable 
that there is a core definition of terrorism at international law that provides guidance to 
States enacting terrorism legislation. However, that to have an effect, States must look 
to international law and accept its guidance. All States should treat the international law 
definitional jurisprudence as setting a minimum level, not a maximum.      
Attempts to Define Terrorism by the International Community
Terrorism has been on the international agenda since 1934, when the League of Nations 
took the first major step towards outlawing the scourge by discussing a draft convention 
for the prevention and punishment of terrorism (United Nations Action to Counter 
Terrorism, http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/instruments.shtml). Although the Convention 
was eventually adopted in 1937, it never came into force due to the failure of the ratification 
process (Fidanci, 2006). Under this section, we intend to address the attempts made by the 
international community to arrive at a generic definition of terrorism by way of making 
reference to the following historic events:     
1 1937 League of Nations Convention 
It is without doubt that the most significant early modern attempt to define terrorism as 
an international crime was undertaken by the League of Nations between 1934 and 1937 
(Marston, 2002). The Convention was drafted in a number of phases between 1935 and 
1937 (Geneva: 1st Session 8 May 1935; 2nd Session 10 Feb 1936; and 3rd Session 26th April 
1937). An international diplomatic conference met in November 1937 to draft and adopt a 
convention based on the final draft submitted by Committee for the International Repression 
of Terrorism (CIRT). The Final Act of the diplomatic conference adopted two international 
conventions–the first defining international terrorist offences, and the second creating an 
international criminal court to punish the offences in the first treaty (Saul, 2005). 
In addition to the above, the first treaty, the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism, required States to criminalize terrorist offences and encouraged 
States to exclude the offences from the political offence exception to extradition (Saul, 
2005). It attracted 24 signatories: 12 were European States, seven were Caribbean, Central 
or South American States, and five others included major States from other regions. The 
Convention was only ratified by one (colonial) State- India, which had separate League 
membership to Britain- and never entered into force (Saul, 2005). The Second World War 
diverted attention from the Convention and with the demise of the League of Nations, 
interest in the Convention never revived. It should be categorically pointed out that despite 
never entering into force, the 1937 League Convention indicates the early views of States 
on terrorism. For example, Article 1(1) reaffirms as a ‘principle of international law’ that it 
is ‘the duty of every State to refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist activities 
ht
tp
://
jis
.u
um
.e
du
.m
y
80
Mohammed Salman Mahmood & Ahmad Masum
directed against another State and to prevent acts in which such activities take shape’. States 
were, however, careful to exclude armed forces from the scope of the Convention, including 
acts committed in civil wars (Geneva: 3rd Session Report, 26th April 1937). Article 1(2) of the 
Convention defines ‘acts of terrorism’ as ‘criminal acts directed against a State and intended 
or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or group of persons 
or the general public. As mentioned earlier, it is important to note that the definition given 
here does not exist and the Convention is not part of international law today because it was 
never entered into force due to the failure of the ratification process (Fidanci, 2006).
2 1954 ILC Draft Code
The International Law Commission considered terrorism when drafting its 1954 Draft Code 
of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind (Part I) (Saul, 2005). Although the 1954 
ILC Draft Code was never formally adopted by the General Assembly or in treaty form, it 
provides an insight into mid-20th century thinking about terrorism in international law (Saul, 
2005). Terrorism was explicitly linked to the concept of aggression. Article 2(6) defines an 
offence ‘against the peace and security of mankind’ of the undertaking or encouragement 
by the authorities of a State of terrorist activities in another State, or the toleration by the 
authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another 
State. It would suffice to note that the offence only covers conduct by those acting for 
the State, and not the activities of non-State actors. Furthermore, due to insurmountable 
disagreement about the definition of aggression, the General Assembly postponed further 
consideration of the 1954 ILC Draft Code until a Special Committee on defining aggression 
had reported (UNGA res 897 (IX) 1954). As a matter of fact subsequent attempts to define 
aggression have eschewed any reference to terrorism and severed the early linkage between 
these concepts. A (non-exhaustive) General Assembly resolution defining ‘aggression’ in 
1974 makes no reference to terrorism, nor does the definition in the 1996 ILC Draft Code or 
in the 1998 Draft Rome Statute. Hence, it is arguable that although the term ‘terrorism’ might 
seem self-evident, in practice it is hard to agree upon a legal definition at the international 
level. This dilemma can be seen for example in the definition of ‘aggression’ as stated 
above. Take for instance the discussion in Rome during the drafting of the International 
Criminal Court Statute. The Statute did not include ‘aggression’ as one of its ‘grave crimes’ 
because the conference could not agree upon its definition, even though efforts to define the 
crime of aggression have been underway since 1948 and despite the fact that Article 51 of 
the UN Charter had shed the light on this issue.
3 1991 and 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes
It should be noted that after the postponement of 1954, the ILC resumed consideration of 
the Draft Code in 1982. Following nine reports by a Special Rapporteur between 1983 and 
1991, the ILC adopted the first reading of a Draft Code in 1991 (Saul, 2005). Article 24 
of the 1991 ILC Draft Code, based on Article 2(6) of the 1954 Draft Code, proposed an 
offence where a State agent or representative commits or orders the following: 
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Undertaking, organizing, assisting, financing, encouraging or tolerating acts 
against another State directed at persons or property and of such a nature as to 
create a state of terror in the minds of public figures, groups or persons or the 
general public.
Based on the above draft provision, it partially incorporates the 1937 League of Nations 
Convention definition; added the notions of ‘organizing’, ‘assisting’ and ‘financing’; and 
included an express reference to acts against property. Despite this being the case, some 
ILC members objected that the definition was tautological and that it would be better to 
refer to ‘a state of fear’ rather than a ‘state of terror’ (Saul, 2005). The difficulty of proving 
subjective fear was also raised. Furthermore, the proposed offence did not apply to private 
individuals and requires a State connection (Sunga, 1997). This again created some grounds 
for disagreement. For example, it is possible that groups of individuals could threaten peace 
and security. In other words, terrorism should cover both private as well as State conduct.
In addition to the above, the final ILC Draft Code (Part II) was adopted in 1996 (ILC, 
Report on 48th Session 6 May–26 July 1996). While earlier drafts between 1990 and 1995 
had included distinct Articles on ‘international terrorism’, a discrete terrorist offence was 
subsumed by, and recast within, the final Article 20 on ‘war crimes’. The war crime of ‘acts 
of terrorism’ in Article 20 embodied the simple prohibition in Article 4(2)(d) of the Protocol 
II (ILC, Report on 48th Session). The position was made clear regardless of the suggestion 
to substitute the phrase ‘state of terror’ to ‘state of fear’ on the basis that there was no longer 
any broader offence of creating a state of terror outside of armed conflict. 
4 1998 Draft Rome Statute
It is important to note that while the 1996 ILC Draft Code was not adopted as a treaty, the 
General Assembly drew it to the attention of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court (UNGA res 51/160 1996). Hence, it is important to make 
reference to Article 5 of the 1998 Draft Rome Statute, which was presented to the 1998 
Rome Diplomatic Conference. By virtue of the Article, ‘crimes of terrorism’ comprised of 
three distinct offences. The first offence was that of:  undertaking, organizing, sponsoring, 
facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating acts of violence against another State 
directed at persons or property and of such a nature as to create terror, fear or insecurity 
in the minds of public figures, groups of persons, the general public or populations, for 
whatever considerations and purposes of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or such other nature that may be invoked to justify them. Looking at the 
first offence, clearly it resembles the 1991 ILC Draft Code and not limited to armed conflict 
(as in the 1996 ILC Draft Code). The first offence also shares elements of the 1937 League 
of Nations Convention definition and a 1994 General Assembly working definition. 
Regarding the second offence, it comprised any offence in six sectoral treaties such as: the 
1971 Montreal Convention; 1970 Hague Convention; 1973 Protected Persons Convention; 
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1979 Hostages Convention; 1988 Rome Convention and 1988 Rome Protocol (Saul, 2005). 
On the other hand, the third offence involved ‘the use of firearms, weapons, explosives and 
dangerous substances when used as a means to perpetrate indiscriminate violence involving 
death or serious bodily injury to persons or groups or persons or populations or serious 
damage to property’. 
With all the energy and time vested, terrorism was not included in the 1998 Rome Statute as 
adopted. It is unfortunate that despite widespread international condemnation of terrorism, 
no generally acceptable definition could be agreed upon. It is inevitable to point out that 
terrorism was not included for a variety of reasons such as: its legal novelty and lack of 
prior definition; disagreement about national liberation violence and so forth. At this point, 
it is important to emphasize that making a single universal definition of terrorism under 
international law is extremely difficult since there is always a possibility for the actions 
of a person or group are described as terrorism (criminal acts) by one side, while the same 
actions are called as the movement for freedom (political acts) by the other side (Fidanci, 
2006). 
5 1996 Draft Nuclear Terrorism Convention
Between 1997 and 2000 an Ad Hoc Committee established by the General Assembly in 
1996 successfully drafted the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention and the 1999 Terrorist 
Financing Convention (Saul, 2005). The General Assembly also tasked the Committee with 
drafting a treaty to suppress nuclear terrorism, based on a draft text submitted by Russia in 
1997, as subsequently revised. The draft text was influenced by the 1980 Vienna Convention 
and the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention (Ad Hoc Committee Report, 1998). Despite 
annual discussions, by the end of 2004, agreement had still not been reached on the draft 
and little progress was made after 1998. 
Perhaps it has to be pointed out that the draft preamble expresses the convention’s rationale, 
stating that ‘acts of nuclear terrorism may result in the gravest consequences and may pose a 
threat to international peace and security’ and that ‘existing multilateral legal provisions do 
not adequately address those attacks’. It would suffice to note that the convention aims to fill 
lacunae left by 1980 Vienna Convention, by covering a wider range of ‘targets, forms and 
acts of nuclear terrorism’ (Corell, 2002). In contrast, the 1980 Vienna Convention is limited 
to offences relating to nuclear material while in international transport or in domestic use, 
storage and transport (1980 Vienna Convention, art 7). 
Furthermore, draft Article 2(1) establishes objective offences where a person unlawfully and 
intentionally possesses or uses radioactive material or devices with the intent to cause death 
or serious bodily injury, or to cause substantial damage to property or the environment. It 
creates the further offences of using radioactive material or devises, or using or damaging 
a nuclear facility, with the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international 
organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act. States must legislate to punish 
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these acts, ‘in particular where they are intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror 
in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons’. It is vital to note that 
while deriving from a 1994 General Assembly definition, itself similar to the 1937 League 
of Nations Convention definition, the notion of a ‘state of terror’ is not an element of the 
offences, nor are the offences described as ‘nuclear terrorism’ as such (Saul, 2005 & 2006). 
By 2003, the principle unresolved issue was the treaty’s scope of application. Draft Article 
4 proposes to exclude the ‘activities of armed forces during armed conflict’ which are 
‘governed’ by International Humanitarian Law (IHL). It further excludes the ‘activities’ of 
State military forces ‘in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed 
by other rules of international law’. Although an identical provision was adopted in the 
1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention, some States wanted the Draft Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention to apply to the activities of State armed forces, and/or State-sponsored nuclear 
terrorism (Saul, 2005). This position is understandable given that States are the primary 
possessors of nuclear material. Some felt that the 1997 provision was ambiguous, while 
others believed it should take into account the contested legality of the use of nuclear 
weapons in armed conflict. 
The authors would like to reiterate that the difficulty in reaching agreement on the 
convention reflects the highly politicized nature of the legality of the use and possession 
of nuclear weapons by States. Hence, the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee drafting the 
convention was renewed in 2004 (UNGA res 54/110, 1999). It would thus suffice to note 
that agreement on the convention may depend on States first reaching agreement on the 
definition of terrorism in the Draft Comprehensive Convention, or even on the resolution of 
conflicts in the Middle East and over Kashmir (Rostow, 2002). 
6 2000 Draft Comprehensive Convention    
The draft preamble of this Convention condemns ‘all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and whomever committed’ (Ad Hoc 
Committee Report 2002). Draft Article 2(1) proposes an offence if a person ‘unlawfully 
and intentionally’ causes: ‘death or serious bodily injury to any person’; ‘serious damage to 
public or private property’; or ‘damage to property, places, facilities, or systems… resulting 
or likely to result in major economic loss’. The purpose of any such conduct, ‘by its nature or 
context’, must be ‘to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act’ [Draft Comprehensive Convention, art 
2(2), (3) and (4) (a)-(c)]. In other words, the prohibited acts must be motivated by purposes 
of intimidation or compulsion, but there is no requirement that acts be motivated by political 
aims or objectives. The treaty proposes to exclude the offences from the political offence 
exception to extradition (Draft Comprehensive Convention, art 14). 
Based on the above, it appears that unlike the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention, the 
Draft Comprehensive Convention proposes to protect private property as well as public 
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property. It captures a wider range of acts against property than the EU Framework Decision, 
by referring to ‘serious damage’ rather than ‘extensive destruction’ (Dumitriu, 2005; Saul, 
2005). Furthermore, like the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention, the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention protects only States or international organizations from compulsion, and not 
NGOs, political parties, corporations or other social groups (Saul, 2005). 
The Draft Comprehensive Convention was also met with some resistance. The first resistance 
being the application of the Convention i.e. whether it should exclude the activities of the 
‘parties’– rather than the ‘armed forces’ during an armed conflict, since reference only 
to ‘armed forces’ might exclude other participants in armed conflict under IHL (OIC 
proposal, in Ad Hoc Committee Report, 2002), particularly as ‘parties’ are mentioned in 
the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions. It is important to note that the 1997 
Terrorist Bombings Convention excludes the ‘activities of armed forces during an armed 
conflict’ from that Convention, as well as the activities of State military forces exercising 
their official duties ‘inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law’. 
This approach is also followed in the EU Framework Decision (Dumitriu, 2005). It should 
be noted that proposed Article 18 of the Draft Comprehensive Convention is based on 
1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention. However, the 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention 
refers to armed forces ‘as understood’ under IHL, but definition in the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention itself would provide further clarity, particularly concerning application to non-
State forces in non-international armed conflicts under Protocol II. Clearly, reference to the 
‘parties’ would be too broad, since it would exclude all State activity in armed conflict – not 
just military activities – as well as numerous non-State armed groups (Ad Hoc Committee 
Report, 2004).  
Apart from the disagreement above, a second disagreement was based on whether situations 
of ‘foreign occupation’ should also be excluded from the Draft Comprehensive Convention, 
in addition to ‘armed conflict’. This proposal was put forward by OIC proposal to exclude 
activities of the ‘parties’ and was intended to cover situations where there are no hostilities 
and IHL may not strictly apply. Politically, it was aimed at excluding non-State violence 
against Israel in the Palestinian Occupied Territories and against India in Kashmir (Rostow, 
2002). It has been argued that this OIC proposal would ‘eviscerate’ the Convention, by 
reintroducing a national liberation exception (Halberstam, 2003). Other States wanted 
even more explicit exemptions for self-determination movements. The third disagreement 
was whether State military forces exercising their official duties should be excluded from 
the Convention if they were merely ‘governed’ by international law or required to be ‘in 
conformity’ with it. The OIC proposed that military forces would be liable for terrorism 
if they were not ‘in conformity’ with international law, including genocide, torture, IHL, 
or State responsibility. These States felt that the Convention should cover State and State-
sponsored terrorism, notwithstanding the application of existing international law to State 
conduct. It seems that the OIC proposal lacks balance since the activities of non-State forces 
are not similarly classified as terrorism if they are not in conformity with international law 
(Saul, 2005; 2006).                                                        
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Challenges Faced by the International Community to Adopt an Accepted 
Universal Definition of Terrorism
Schmid and Jongman (1988), in their book Political Terrorism, list 109 different definitions 
of terrorism in existence between 1936 and 1981 (Ganor 2002, p. 290). Moreover, as 
Golder and Williams (2004, p. 270) say, the number would be more, but all efforts to create 
generally recognized legal definition of terrorism have failed in international law.  There 
are many reasons for not reaching a consensus on the definition of terrorism in international 
community and cultural relativism is seen as the main reason for the disagreement. It 
appears that because of this cultural relativism argument, the definition of terrorism shows 
differences even from community to community. Likewise, it has been defined differently 
by politicians, security experts and journalists (Ganor 2002, p. 290). As Begorre-Bret (2005, 
p. 1993) remarks: ‘Failure is in their interest because it strengthens ethical and juridical 
relativism’. Based on this assertion, it can be said that cultural relativism is acknowledged 
as a challenge. Moreover, as Ganor (2002, p. 290) claims, in the absence of an objective and 
authoritative description, which is acknowledged by all nations, fighting against terrorism 
will suffer from cultural relativism. The problem arises from the fact that we are seeking 
a firm definition of untenable terms. As Ganor (2002, p. 287) claims, there is a tendency 
to believe that an objective and universally recognized definition of terrorism can never be 
achieved because this term is a variable. For instance, one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter and he adds that the answer will alter according to subjective view of the 
describer.
The concept of terrorism itself has been seen as another form of challenge hindering the 
process of having an accepted universal definition. According to some scholars, the inability 
to define terrorism in international law can be acceptable because as Schmid (2004a, p. 
395) points out ‘terrorism is a ‘contested concept’ and political, legal, social science and 
popular notions of it are often diverging’. Hence, terrorism appears not to be a mere legal 
issue; it is in the scope of politics and law (Schmid, 2004b). Perhaps some would argue 
that law alone is inadequate to designate the concept of terrorism. It may well be that the 
problem is the political side of terrorism, and possibly for this reason, the definition of 
terrorism differed throughout history. As Begorre-Bret (2005, p. 1988) notes, over the 
years: ‘the member States did not manage to reach any consensus concerning the definition 
of terrorism’ because every State has different backgrounds and regimes. However, if one 
State defines terrorism broadly and the other has a narrow one, a constant consensual policy 
will be a difficult goal. Concordantly, Begorre-Bret (2005, p. 1992) points out the subjective 
concept of terrorism; that it is not feasible to define terrorism since it is impossible to 
discern objectively between legitimate force and illegitimate violence, between “ the hero” 
and “the barbarian”, and between “the warrior” and “the murderer”. There is no objective 
explanation of terrorism but only several partial and ideological characterizations of the 
violence of the foe.
It could also not be denied that the other challenge facing the international community in 
adopting a universally accepted definition of terrorism is based on the interest of the States. 
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Indeed it is unfortunate that when States define terrorism they focus on their own priorities 
in reference to their national interest; therefore, the definition should be disinterested. As 
Ganor (2002, p. 290) remarks: ‘if all the enlightened countries do not change their priorities, 
and do not disenable their political and economic interest, it will not be feasible to wage 
an effective war against terrorism’. In this regard, Begorre-Bret (2005, p. 1995) makes an 
important point, that the States and criminal organizations themselves create the disputes 
and confusion about definition because they do not wish to limit their reasons to the use 
of force. Perhaps it is the policy of certain Nations or States to avoid clear-cut definitions, 
thereby giving them ample discretion in their actions or interests. 
The final challenge facing the international community in adopting a universally accepted 
definition of terrorism is based on its own reluctance to define terrorism. How far is that 
actually true? This assertion of the international community being reluctant to define 
terrorism is purely based on a lame excuse i.e. although international organizations are 
aware of the definition issue, they hesitate to create universally accepted definition. They 
condemn terrorism but they do not define, so what do they reflect on? As Walter, Vonkey, 
Roben, and Schorkopf (2004; cited in Golder and Williams 2004, p. 271) accept, it is clearly 
required to create a consistent legal definition of terrorism. It should be borne in mind that 
even international definition or treaties alone cannot solve the problem since the States co-
operations are essential in order to eliminate the threat of terrorism and make the world a 
safer place.       
The Emerging Consensus on Certain Elements of Definition of Terrorism
Regardless of the previous discussions on the issue of lack of a single accepted universal 
definition of terrorism by the international community, it would suffice to note that this has 
resulted in the international law choosing various forms of counter-measures against certain 
acts of terrorism under different international conventions since 1963 and to introduce 
measures to make sure international co-operation to investigate, combat and eliminate 
terrorist incidents in certain situations (Cassese, 2003). Therefore, the major anti-terrorism 
conventions are drafted within the framework of the UN and ratified by many States. 
Accordingly, at present, there are 14 international conventions addressing terrorism and 
related activities, each covering a specific type of criminal activities, including seizure of 
airplanes, political assassination, the use of explosives, hostage-taking, nuclear terrorism 
and assorted bombings. It is vital to note that all these conventions require contracting States 
to introduce appropriate national legislations in their own jurisdiction in order to punish the 
specific crimes mentioned by each convention (Fidanci, 2006). Furthermore, by way of 
resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, it was decided by the UN Security Council that 
Member States are under obligation to prevent the financing of terrorism and the sheltering 
of the performers. Under paragraph 6 of this resolution, it was decided that Member States 
were obliged to report concrete measures taken to implement their obligations within 90 
days to a committee set up for this purpose (Fidanci, 2006). Regardless of these obligations 
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requiring State parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought 
under a given convention or protocol, none of these conventions provides a clear definition 
of terrorism. 
Despite the absence of a single universal definition of terrorism as mentioned above, it 
has to be acknowledged that there is an emerging consensus on certain elements regarding 
the definition of terrorism. Hence, it would suffice to note that three main elements seem 
to be required for the crime of international terrorism (Cassese, 2003). First, the acts 
must constitute a criminal offence under most national legal systems, such as murder, 
kidnapping, hostage-taking, bombing. In other words, the terrorist act must lie in conduct 
that is already criminalized under any national body of criminal law. Second, they must 
be aimed at spreading terror by means of violent action directed to a State, the public or 
particular groups of persons. It is undeniable fact that this element can be found in almost 
all definitions of terrorism used in national law (Walter et al., 2004). Hence, a number of 
international instruments and national laws provide that the objective pursued by terrorists 
may be either to spread terror among the population or to compel a government or an 
international organization to perform or abstain from performing an act. Third, they must be 
politically, religiously, or ideologically motivated. It cannot be denied that terrorism as an 
act of violence has been committed by people from all religious and political backgrounds. 
Hence, terrorism occurs when ideological motivation meets the operational capability. 
Apart from that, scholars have been working on a definition of terrorism for decades now. 
Schmidt and Jongman in 1988 referenced 109 definitions of terrorism. The first thing that 
comes to mind is the important number of definitions that have been cataloged in 1988. 
Levitt in 1986 commented: The search for a legal definition of terrorism in some ways 
resembles the quest for the Holy Grail: periodically, eager souls set out, full of purpose, 
energy and self-confidence, to succeed where so many others before have tried and failed. 
Levitt identified two different ways of defining terrorism: the “deductive method” and “the 
inductive method”. On the one hand, deductive definitions of terrorism have three elements: 
(1) a substantive element (enumeration of deeds considered acts of terrorism), (2) the intent 
element (explicit mention that the act was intended) and (3) the jurisdictional element 
(towards whom the terrorist act is directed). On the other hand, the inductive method “relies 
upon a relatively precise description of the conduct constituting the substantive element and 
omits the political intent element that characterized the deductive approach”. In other words, 
while inductive definitions aim at defining what a terrorist act is, deductive definitions try 
to answer the broader question of what terrorism is. The substantive element almost always 
refers to the use of violence and force. In their 1988 study, Schmidt and Jongman found 
that violence and force appear in 83.5% of the 109 definitions of terrorism, being by far the 
most recurrent theme. 
In addition to the above, John Dugard considered in 1974 that an ideal definition of terrorism 
“should expressly state that motive is irrelevant in determining whether an act of terrorism 
has been committed”. What mattered by then and throughout the 1970s was the nature of 
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the act, and who the targets were. Most scholars have now shifted position on the issue, 
considering that a workable definition of terrorism should comprise the motive element. 
The absence of the motive element in international conventions is, as mentioned earlier, 
due to the need to reach consensus. States did not however discard deductive definitions 
of terrorism, as many of them use such definitions at the national level. The question of 
motive is one of the reasons for which the adoption of a universally recognized definition 
of terrorism has been stalled for years, despite the United Nations’ continuous efforts to 
elaborate the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism since 1996.
In summary, the Security Council Resolution 1566, which was unanimously accepted by 
Council members in October 2004, may be a basis for hope that countries will overcome 
prior disputes, rise above their own interests, and reach an agreement in the near future 
regarding the international definition of terrorism. Resolution 1566, without serving as the 
definition itself, already establishes one basic principle on which an international definition 
can be built. It stipulates that terrorism is a crime against civilians, which in no circumstance 
can be justified by political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other 
considerations. 
International Legal Instruments use in the Prevention of Terrorist Acts
As mentioned earlier, terrorism has been on the international agenda since 1934, when the 
League of Nations took the first major step towards outlawing the scourge by discussing a 
draft convention for the prevention and punishment of terrorism. Although the Convention 
was eventually adopted in 1937, it never came into force due to the failure of the ratification 
process (Fidanci, 2006). Regardless of this state of affair, since 1963, the international 
community has elaborated 14 universal legal instruments and four amendments to prevent 
terrorist acts (United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism, http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/
instruments.shtml). Those instruments were developed under the auspices of the UN and its 
specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and are open to 
participation by all Member States.  In 2005, the international community also introduced 
substantive changes to three of these universal instruments to specifically account for the 
threat of terrorism; on 8 July of that year States adopted the Amendments to the Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and on 14 October they agreed to both 
the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 
(United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism, http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/instruments.
shtml).   
Two more legal instruments were added in 2010: the 2010 Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation and the 2010 Protocol Supplementary 
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to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. These treaties further 
criminalize the act of using civil aircraft as a weapon, and using dangerous materials to 
attack aircraft or other targets on the ground. The unlawful transport of biological, chemical 
and nuclear weapons and their related material becomes punishable under the treaties. 
Moreover, directors and organizers of attacks against aircraft and airports will have no safe 
haven. Making a threat against civil aviation may also trigger criminal liability. 
From the foregoing discussion above, at present, there are 14 universal legal instruments 
or international conventions addressing terrorism and related activities, each covering a 
specific type of criminal activities (United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism, http://www.
un.org/en/terrorism/instruments.shtml). The 14 universal legal instruments or international 
conventions are: 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft (Aircraft Convention); 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft (Unlawful Seizure Convention); 1971 Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Act against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Civil Aviation Convention); 1973 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons (Diplomatic Agents Convention); 1979 International Convention against the Taking 
of Hostages (Hostages Convention); 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material (Nuclear Materials Convention); 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts of Violence at Airports, Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Airport 
Protocol); 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Fixed Platform Protocol); 1991 Convention 
on the Making of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Plastic Explosives 
Convention); 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
(Terrorist Bombing Convention); 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention); 2005 International Convention 
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention); and 
2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil 
Aviation (New Civil Aviation Convention). 
It is obvious that all these Conventions require contracting States to introduce appropriate 
national laws in their own jurisdiction in order to punish the specific crimes mentioned by 
each Convention. Regrettably, implementation of these Conventions has not been easy and 
more importantly, no operational mechanism has been established to evaluate measures 
undertaken by the State parties. However, by way of resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, 
it was decided by the UN Security Council that Member States are under obligation to 
prevent the financing of terrorism and the sheltering of the performers. Under paragraph 
6 of this resolution, it was decided that Member States were obliged to report concrete 
measures taken to implement their obligations within 90 days to a committee set up for 
this purpose. But still there is a daunting task ahead due to the fact that even if State parties 
are under obligations to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought 
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under a given Convention or Protocol, none of these Conventions provide a clear definition 
of terrorism.            
   
Conclusion
It is evident from the above discussions that making a single universally accepted definition 
of terrorism under international law is extremely difficult since there is always a possibility 
for the actions of a person or group being described as terrorism (criminal acts) by one side, 
while the same actions are deemed as an act of freedom (political acts) by the other side 
(Fidanci, 2006). For instance, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and other groups 
such as HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) fighting against Israel in order to set up 
an independent state for their people are regarded as terrorist groups by Israel, but at the 
same time are considered as liberation movements by Muslims, and in particular the Arabs. 
As a matter of fact, legally defining terrorism is far from being an easy task. Even though 
everyone has a vague idea of what terrorism is, one has much trouble outlining what it is 
exactly.
There is no doubt that that a general definition of terrorism is necessary in order for the 
international community to fight against terrorism in a precise way. It is wholly admitted 
that although the term ‘terrorism’ might seem self-evident, in practice it is hard to agree 
upon a legal definition at the international level. From the foregoing discussions above, it 
is important to note that the international community has endorsed the inductive method 
by focusing merely on the substantive and jurisdictional element. This resulted in the 
adoption of sectoral conventions on terrorism. As a matter of fact, all of the 14 international 
conventions on terrorism listed by the UN connect terrorism with the use or threat of use 
of force and violence. It cannot be denied that there is a core definition of terrorism at 
international law that provides guidance to States enacting terrorism legislation, but that to 
have an effect, States must look to international law and accept its guidance (Young, 2006). 
As a concluding remark, the international definition of terrorism is destined to develop 
very slowly, and States need to tailor their legislation to specific national circumstances 
and respond to threats (Saul, 2006). The ease with which terrorists can cross borders means 
States cannot protect themselves simply by enacting and enforcing domestic legislation 
proscribing terrorism within their borders. Rather, every State must have legislation denying 
terrorists safe havens and safe places of operation. An established minimum international 
law definition of terrorism that informs States’ domestic criminal law is required to ensure 
a baseline of consistency and to facilitate international cooperation. The core definition 
identified in this paper provides that minimum as well as a yardstick against which to 
measure States’ legislation. The existence of a definition of terrorism is important. It 
shapes States’ understanding of the problem, delimits their responses to it, and helps to 
distinguish lawful from unlawful responses (Young, 2006). The perceived absence of an 
accepted international law definition is said by some largely to explain the inadequacy of 
international law’s ability to combat terrorism. 
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